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Abstract 
 
In the era of ‘activation’ which is characterized by the decentralization and 
individualization of social services, welfare caseworkers play an increasingly important role 
in shaping the policy outcomes of the welfare state. In this paper, it is argued that in order to 
theoretically accommodate the complex institutional and systemic environments in which 
today’s caseworkers operate, the street-level bureaucracy approach introduced by Lipsky 
should be married with institutionalist theory, thereby laying the groundwork for a micro-
institutionalist theory of policy implementation.  
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Introduction: Street-Level Work in a Changing Context 
 
In 1978, Michael Lipsky laid the groundwork for the street-level policy approach. The 
core argument introduced by Lipsky was that street-level bureaucrats such as caseworkers in 
local social service organizations should be acknowledged and conceptualized as the last link 
in the policy-making chain, because it is only in the interaction between caseworkers and 
clients that formal social policy comes to life. Two years later, in his seminal Street-Level 
Bureaucracy (1980), Lipsky set out to develop the theoretical implications of his initial 
proposition further, drawing primarily on the analytical toolkit of rational-choice 
institutionalism. According to Lipsky’s model, the behavior of street-level bureaucrats is 
mainly influenced by two factors: firstly, the organizational context that sets the goals, rules, 
budgetary and time resources for bureaucratic action; and secondly, the intrinsic cognitive-
emotional utility functions of individual street-level bureaucrats which, in interplay with the 
organizational context, will determine whether street-level bureaucrats rigorously apply, 
creatively adapt, or undermine formal policy goals in their interaction with particular clients 
or client groups. 
Thirty-two years after the publication of Lipsky’s book, it seems that policy-makers 
have taken Lipsky’s message to heart. In fact, the realization that street-level bureaucrats 
actively make policy has been one of the drivers behind decentralization processes in many 
welfare states, grounded in the logic that if local managers and caseworkers are given partial 
responsibility for the policy outcomes they produce, they are more likely to support rather 
than sidestep national policy goals (Van Berkel & Borghi, 2008). Especially in a European 
context, decentralization has furthermore implied changes to the role of caseworkers in public 
social service organizations, with caseworkers now assuming a variety of tasks such as 
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participating in the formulation of their organization’s policy goals, developing new 
instruments for client treatment, building policy networks with public and private 
organizations as well as societal stakeholders, and autonomously managing budgets for client 
processing, to give just a few examples (Durose, 2011; Ellis, 2011; Henman & Fenger, 2006). 
Besides decentralization, a second and associated trend that has been altering the role 
of welfare caseworkers is the policy agenda of activation (Clasen & Clegg, 2006; Eichhorst, 
Kaufmann, Konle-Seidl, & Reinhard, 2008). Activation policies have been widely 
implemented in the areas of unemployment, social care and to some degree even pensions 
since the early 1990s, based on the notion that in the post-war era, overly generous welfare 
states nourished a habitus of dependency among benefit recipients. Consequently, activation 
implies that welfare clients are strongly encouraged to find work and become economically 
self-sufficient, either in the form of ‘carrots’ (like job retraining, personal care, or labor 
market reintegration budgets) or ‘sticks’ (job application requirements, sanctions). Because 
such a mind shift can best be achieved through services that are tailor-made to the needs and 
skills of individual clients, caseworkers play a very important role in deciding what activation 
means in practice, and for whom (Borghi & Van Berkel, 2007; Newman, 2007).  
Because the welfare state context in which caseworkers operate has thus changed 
significantly over the past twenty years, this paper argues that Lipsky’s model of policy 
implementation should be broadened to accommodate the new features of the activating state. 
In particular, a model is needed that not only addresses the wider economic, political, cultural 
and social processes influencing caseworker actions but also covers the feedback loops by 
which caseworker-managers shape societal structures in return.  
In order to contribute to this theoretical endeavor, Lipsky’s approach is combined here 
with elements from institutionalist theory and especially sociological institutionalism 
(Giddens, 1981; Powell & DiMaggio, Eds., 1991). The result is a micro-institutionalist model 
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of policy implementationi that conceptually embeds individual caseworker actions in a wider 
web of economic, political, cultural and social structures. In the following section, the 
theoretical foundations of a micro-institutionalist model of policy implementation will be 
presented. In the remainder of the article, existing literature on the implementation of social 
policy will be used to illustrate how a conceptual bridge can be built between the micro-level 
of the caseworker-client interaction, the meso-level of the implementing organization, and the 
macro-level of the wider societal context. 
 
Micro-Institutionalism in a Nutshell 
 
Micro-institutionalism, with its focus on individual agents as the basic unit of analysis, 
departs from the stipulation that the entire social world is constituted by the actions of people. 
When a particular action pattern becomes standardized, i.e. becomes the standard response in 
or to a particular type of situation, one can speak of the creation of an ‘institution.’ To use the 
words of Anthony Giddens, one of the founding fathers of micro-institutional theory, 
institutions are “structured social practices that have a broad spatial and temporal extension: 
that are structured in what the historian Braudel calls the longue durée of time, and which are 
followed or acknowledged by the majority of the members of a society” (1981, p. 164). For 
example, marriage is an institution because it elicits a wide range of standard behaviors such 
as wearing a wedding ring, referring to one’s spouse as ‘my husband’ or ‘my wife,’ and not 
marrying B while being still married to A. In the world of social politics, unemployment 
benefits are an institution because all recipients of unemployment benefits will display certain 
behavioral patterns such as appearing at the Public Employment Service (PES) at regular 
intervals, not working in (regular) jobs while receiving unemployment benefits, and writing 
job applications to meet the benefit requirements of the PES.  
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Hence, institutions are ideas about the world that arguably come into being through the 
aggregated and increasingly standardized interactions of people. Once created, institutions 
then give meaning, purpose and direction to human interaction in a particular type of situation 
but thereby also restrict the action patterns that are relevant, appropriate, or even permitted in 
that type of situation. To return shortly to the example of marriage, buying a bus ticket is not a 
relevant behavior to the institution of marriage; having an amorous tête-à-tête with a person 
other than your spouse is certainly not appropriate; and marrying B while you are still married 
to A is even prohibited by law. 
Yet if institutions legitimize certain actions while prohibiting others in a particular 
type of situation, does that mean that no other action patterns will ever become relevant, 
appropriate, or even permitted in that situation? No, argues micro-institutionalism, because 
just as individual human action is embedded in institutional contexts, institutions are in turn 
constituent parts of wider economic, political and/or cultural landscapes or “systems,” to 
borrow the terminology of systems theory (cf. Habermas, 1976, esp. pp. 5-6; Parsons, Shils, 
& Olds, 1951). And whenever a change occurs in these larger systemic landscapes, so do the 
prerequisites for action and hence also the meaning or scope of the related institutions.ii For 
instance, when a law is passed that grants homosexual couples the right to marry (a political 
systemic change), more and more homosexual couples will in fact get married (a changed 
action pattern) which in turn will change the institution of marriage from a formal union 
between a man and a woman to a formal union between two adult persons.        
So far, we have thus seen that from a micro-institutionalist perspective, all social 
reality begins with individual human action; that aggregated and increasingly routinized 
(inter-) action leads to the emergence of institutions which form part of larger economic, 
political and cultural systemic landscapes; that institutions, once emerged, frame and/or 
restrict the actions that are relevant, appropriate, or permitted in certain types of situations; 
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and that systemic changes may induce alterations in the meaning or scope of institutions, thus 
changing the prerequisites for individual action (see Figure 1).  
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
As a last point, however, it should be mentioned that micro-institutionalism leaves 
some room for autonomous action outside of institutional blueprints, because while 
institutions do influence action, they do not fully determine it. As a result, it is not only the 
case that systemic changes may induce institutional change which subsequently elicits 
changed patterns of action, but it is likewise possible that the aggregated autonomous actions 
of individual agents may change the meaning or scope of an institution and thereby also the 
systemic environment of which that institution forms a part. To illustrate, when more and 
more married people get a divorce, this will not only transform the institution of marriage 
from a lifelong union into a periodical union but will also affect changes in the political and 
cultural underpinnings of societal life, such as when social security laws must be adapted to a 
new reality in which married women cannot automatically be assumed to be insured via their 
husbands, for example. 
 
 
 
Applying Micro-Institutionalism in a Welfare State Setting 
 
In the previous section, a basic model of the interplay between societal systems, 
institutions and individual action was presented. In this section, that micro-institutionalist 
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model will be applied to the interaction between caseworkers and clients in a welfare state 
setting.  
To begin with, any micro-institutionalist account of policy implementation must start 
with the stipulation that the welfare state as an institution is ‘real’ only in so far as it is 
constantly (re-) enacted and (re-) negotiated in the interaction between welfare caseworkers 
and clients. To elaborate, although the building blocks of the welfare state are to be found in 
legal documents and regulations, in the organizations responsible for the administration of 
welfare programs, in the staff hired to carry out the necessary casework, and in the fiscal 
budgets to be transferred to citizens in need, the welfare state only becomes real as a political 
institution once actors begin to act upon those prerequisites by implementing or changing 
welfare regulations, by incorporating these regulations into the administration of welfare 
programs, by adjusting their casework to the applicable regulations, and by treating citizens in 
a certain way. Thus, according to micro-institutional theory, only when the welfare state 
(represented by caseworkers) meets citizens in need does it really come into existence.  
Micro-institutionalism would also predict, however, that because individual agents 
such as caseworkers and clients have the autonomous capacity to enact an institution such as 
the welfare state in ways that partially deviate from institutionalized patterns, the moment at 
which the welfare state becomes a manifest reality in the interaction between caseworkers and 
clients is also the moment when it starts to evolve and possibly to change (Marshall & 
Rollinson, 2004). To quote Giddens once again (1981, p. 171): “The structured properties of 
society [such as the welfare state] … only exist (a) in their instantiation in social systems, 
made possible (b) by the memory-traces (reinforced or altered in the continuity of daily social 
life) that constitute the knowledgeability of social actors.”  
The following three sections will build on existing studies to illustrate how the 
institution of the welfare state is both reinforced and changed through the aggregated 
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interactions between caseworkers and clients on the micro-level of social policy. First, the 
interaction proper between caseworkers and clients as the nucleus of welfare state 
development and change is discussed. Second, the role of the implementing organization in 
shaping the caseworker-client interaction is addressed. Both of these sections draw 
substantially on Lipsky’s analytical repertoire but reframe it in micro-institutionalist terms. 
Lastly, some possible feedback mechanisms between the caseworker-client interaction, the 
implementing organization, and the wider economic, political, cultural and/or social 
environment are presented. 
 
The Caseworker-Client Interaction from a Micro-Institutionalist Perspective 
 
As was already implied above, micro-institutionalism adds two important insights to 
the literature on social policy implementation. Most fundamentally, micro-institutionalist 
theory posits that the welfare state as a societal institution is not just a product of the laws and 
regulations which elaborate how it should function, but rather is continuously and 
dynamically produced and reproduced in the interaction among people, i.e. more precisely, 
among public officials and citizens. For instance, imagine that a parliament passes a law 
which states that all unemployed persons who miss more than two appointments with their 
caseworkers should lose ten percent of their benefits, but caseworkers across the country do 
not report absences to protect their clients. Does the welfare state then sanction or not 
sanction unexcused absences? Certainly the latter, in spite of a social policy that states 
otherwise. It is thus not primarily in rules and regulations, but rather in human actions that 
institutions (like the welfare state) are enacted and come alive. 
As a second point, due to micro-institutionalism’s focus on the enactment of 
institutions through human action, micro-institutionalism draws our attention to the fact that 
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in spite of seemingly iron laws and regulations, the benefits citizens receive from the welfare 
state are not fixed because they must be awarded and transferred through casework, which 
proceeds by way of human interaction and can therefore have rather different outcomes 
depending on the situation and the individuals involved (Berman, 1978; Lipsky 1978, 1980, 
1991). Because there is already a considerable literature on the factors which may influence 
the caseworker-client interaction and may tip the balance either in favor or against generous 
client support, only the most salient of those factors shall briefly be reviewed here. 
 
The role of the caseworker. On the side of the caseworker, an important factor which 
may have an influence on how favorably a client is perceived and treated by the 
representatives of the welfare state is the professional identity of the caseworker. On the one 
hand, there is the sympathetic caseworker type described by Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
(2003, p. 62) who “define themselves as advocates on a mission rather than bureaucrats 
implementing policy.” As Maynard-Moody and Musheno demonstrate, these caseworkers will 
often go an extra mile in order to help clients in need and even bend the rules if their personal 
“logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 2009) commands them to do so. On the other 
hand, there are the rule-abiding bureaucrats described by Lipsky (1980, p. 149) who deny 
discretion and hide behind rules as a defense “against the possibility that they might be able to 
act more as clients would wish.”  These caseworkers may be more unwilling to take into 
account the personal life circumstances of their clients, but one might also say that they are 
more inclined to treat all clients equally. In any case, as has become clear from this paragraph, 
the amount and kind of benefits received by welfare clients are not only a question of legal 
rights, but also of caseworker identity. 
Closely connected with the professional identity of the caseworker are caseworkers’ 
ideas about what makes clients ‘worthy’ of public solidarity. As Lipsky notes, “street-level 
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bureaucrats, like everyone else, have personal standards of whether or not someone is 
deserving” (1980, p. 23). And for “worthy” clients, caseworkers are much more inclined to 
stretch the rules as much as possible, to provide extra service or information, and sometimes 
even break the rules (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). However, if a client is labeled as a 
“bad guy,” his or her perceived character flaws may serve as a legitimation “to limit service, 
to punish even slight misdeeds, and to confirm the street-level worker’s moral judgment of the 
individual” (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003, p. 143). The moral criteria applied by 
caseworkers in determining the worthiness of a client may vary greatly and encompass 
anything from the willingness or ability to change, the motivation to improve one’s condition, 
taking responsibility for one’s own life, active participation in society, human dignity, human 
need, etc. Here again, different caseworker values may have very different outcomes in terms 
of the scope and kinds of benefits that citizens receive from the welfare state. 
Lastly, also relevant in the caseworker-client interaction are the education and training 
of the caseworker, including language skills when facing immigrant clients (Jonsson, 1998); 
the private situation of the caseworker and any personal experiences he or she might have 
with particular social groups such as immigrants, single mothers, alcohol addicts, etc. 
(Dubois, 2010, pp. 124-125); and the frequency of interaction with individual clients, since a 
shared level of understanding is less likely to arise when interaction is infrequent (Kiser & 
Ostrom, 1982, p. 203).   
 
The role of the client. This brings us to a third vital contribution  micro-
institutionalism makes to the study of social policy implementation, namely a focus not only 
on the caseworker, but also on the client in the caseworker-client interaction (Brodkin & 
Majmundar, 2008). On the client side, it could be assumed that the argument which Schneider 
and Ingram (1993) have made for the policy-making process also holds for the 
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implementation of social policy, namely that clients belonging to societally influential or 
positively constructed groups will ceteris paribus receive better treatment than clients who 
belong to negatively constructed and/or non-influential groups – once again for reasons of 
‘deservingness’ and also of political legitimacy. In contrast, Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
(2003, p. 94) contend that “street-level workers do not see citizen-clients as abstractions – ‘the 
disabled,’ ‘the poor,’ ‘the criminal’ – but as individuals with flaws and strengths who rarely 
fall within the one-size-fits-all approach of policies and laws.” According to these authors, 
what matters more in determining the approach of caseworkers to clients are physical 
attributes such as skin color, gender, age (p. 91) and sexuality (Jenkins, 2000, p. 18), or 
character types such as “troublemaker,” “personality disorder” or “nice lady” (Maynard-
Moody & Musheno, 2003, p. 154). Another feature which may have a strong impact on how 
clients are treated by caseworkers are language abilities, as Jonsson (1998, p. 33) points out: 
When clients cannot express their needs well, this can make them appear as dubious 
characters in the eyes of the caseworker, unless the latter has good cross-cultural skills and is 
able to bridge the cultural and language divide. 
Apart from social or cultural constructions, the behavior of the client towards the 
caseworker is naturally very decisive for the caseworker’s response to the client’s concerns. 
As Lipsky notes, caseworkers have a tendency to be more responsive to cooperative or helpful 
clients because those are seen as better investments for the caseworker’s time, efforts and 
budget resources (Lipsky, 1980, p. 152). Maynard-Moody and Musheno also note that 
caseworkers are more inclined to make exceptions and stretch the rules if clients are 
cooperative, whereas a rule-bound and strictly bureaucratic approach may be used to 
discipline recalcitrant citizens (2003, p. 137). However, Jonsson observes that caseworkers 
may in fact resort to a variety of strategies next to the “bureaucratic administrator strategy” 
when they perceive their clients as difficult to deal with, such as the “caring professional 
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strategy,” the “caring ‘amateur’ strategy,” and the “coordinator strategy.” In each of these 
cases, a client may experience very different treatment by the welfare state depending on the 
interpersonal dynamics unfolding between him or her and the caseworker.    
Lastly, the amount and kind of benefits which a citizen receives from the welfare state 
may depend to a considerable degree on the client’s knowledge of the law and familiarity with 
the system of social security (Dubois, 2010, pp. 29-34). This of course favors individuals with 
a higher education, good language skills, and experience in dealing with a country’s national 
authorities.  
As has become apparent from this short and highly selective review of the street-level 
bureaucracy literature, personal attributes can have a strong impact on how the institution of 
the welfare state is enacted and changed in the everyday-encounters between caseworkers and 
citizens. Before we turn to the role of organizations in influencing the caseworker-client 
interaction, however, let it be remarked here that the welfare state is the primary, but not the 
only societal institution which is evoked and (re-) negotiated in the caseworker-client 
interaction. For instance, the institution of work stands central in the interaction process (cf. 
Moser, 1998), with discursive struggles revolving around the question what counts as work 
and how much work is minimally acceptable, such as paid labor, being an artist, raising 
children, or doing community work. Another central institution which plays a significant role 
in the caseworker-client interaction process is the institution of collective solidarity, with 
some of the contestable subjects involved being who deserves public solidarity, how much 
public solidarity is adequate or sufficient, what should the addressee of public solidarity do to 
repay the community’s favor, and which moral principle should serve as the basis for public 
solidarity (cf. Deutsch, 1975; Svallfors, 1997). Especially in the era of activation when clients 
must often convince their caseworkers that an investment in their human capital will prove 
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profitable, the institution of collective solidarity can be expected to be more often and more 
thoroughly (re-) negotiated during the caseworker-client interaction than before (Cox, 1998). 
 
The Caseworker-Client Interaction in an Organizational Context 
 
Above, we have seen that according to micro-institutionalism, human interaction is 
always embedded in societal structures such as (a) economic, political, cultural and social 
systems, and (b) societal institutions, i.e. “patterned, organized and symbolically-templated 
‘ways-of-doing-things’” (Jenkins, 2000, p. 10). However, these systems and institutions not 
only affect and shape human interaction, but are in turn also affected, reinforced and changed 
by it. Thus, the dynamism between structure and agency can be regarded as the central 
proposition of micro-institutionalist theory (Marshall & Rollinson, 2004, p. S76). 
In complex modern societies, however, human interaction is often mediated by a 
specific type of institution, namely organizations (Meyer, Boli, & Thomas, 1987; Meyer & 
Jepperson, 2000). In terms of the micro-institutionalist model of action presented above, the 
institutional characteristics of organizations can be concretized as follows. Organizations  
(a) are usually embedded primarily in one particular societal system, like a monastery in 
the cultural system, a firm in the economic system, or a parliament in the political 
system. This system will serve as the strongest reference point for any interaction 
within the organization, but the remaining societal systems will have an influence on, 
and be influenced by, the organization as well; 
(b)  are ‘meso’-systems built around a specific core institution or set of institutions, such 
as a monastery around a religion like Catholicism or Buddhism, a firm around the 
maxim of profit-making, or a parliament around the institution of legislation, with all 
the standardized interaction patterns this entails (e.g. praying and burning incense in 
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the case of Buddhism or Catholicism, exchanging a good or service for more money 
than it cost to produce in the case of profit-making, or debating draft laws and voting 
on them in the parliament building in the case of legislature);   
(c) also have institutional characteristics, i.e. they develop routinized and formalized 
interaction patterns (interaction ‘blueprints’) which however are applicable only to the 
members and clients of the organization, not to society as a whole. In short, 
organizations inhabit an intermediary space between societal systems and institutions, 
sharing characteristics of both (Figure 2).  
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
 
Bringing this enhanced micro-institutionalist argumentation home to the interaction 
between welfare caseworkers and clients, we can say that welfare organizations are usually 
primarily embedded in the political system, which will thus have the strongest impact on the 
way in which standardized interaction patterns are structured within the organization. 
Furthermore, as was discussed above, welfare organizations are primarily built around the 
institution of the welfare state but also other associated institutions such as collective 
solidarity, work, etc. that will not only shape interactions within the organization but will also 
be affected and re-shaped by interactions within the organization over time. Lastly, it should 
not be forgotten that organizations have institutional characteristics themselves, which implies 
that any policy-implementing organization will add its own enabling and restricting elements 
to the process of policy implementation. It is to a review of the organizational factors shaping 
the interaction between welfare caseworkers and clients that we now turn.        
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Organizational politics. In terms of organizational politics, the caseworker-client 
interaction will be influenced on the one hand by the degree of autonomy of the implementing 
organization from municipal policy directives or national oversight, and on the other hand by 
the goals set for the organization by the top-management, such as cost-saving, efficiency of 
client processing, or adequacy of addressing clients’ needs. As Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 
(2001) have shown in a case study on municipal welfare governance in three U.S. states, these 
goals can vary considerably not only among, but also within regional contexts. For instance, 
in order to cut down on costs, welfare organizations may adjust their hiring patterns and try to 
hire only “workers less sympathetic to clients” (Lipsky, 1991: 217) or people with an 
accounting background rather than a background in social work. On the other hand, 
organizations may deliberately choose to hire trained social workers as front-line staff if they 
want to ensure that clients are treated emphatically and their needs are addressed properly. 
Apart from hiring policy, a second strategy welfare organizations can employ to discourage 
clients from even applying for welfare benefits is democratic proceduralism (Brodkin & 
Majmundar, 2008), as when many different forms and documents are required for the initial 
application or when waiting times for an appointment are very long. Thirdly, welfare 
organizations may adjust the caseload of their front-line staff as a strategy to either favor the 
“creaming” of the most promising clients, or to enable the intensive counseling of more 
vulnerable clients (Lipsky, 1980, pp. 107-108). (From this, however, one should not conclude 
that high caseloads are always a function of organizational strategy – they may also be 
retraceable to the funds made available to the organization by the municipal or national 
government, i.e. to the policy goals of actors on the local, regional or national political level; 
see below). Fourthly, monetary rewards or other credits can be used to direct caseworkers’ 
attention and time resources more towards certain client groups, such as young unemployed 
below the age of 25, immigrants with low language skills, or single mothers who cannot get 
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND THE WELFARE STATE                                                       17 
 
back to work if there is no day-care available for their children (cf. Lipsky, 1980, p. 108). 
Fifthly, the outcome of the caseworker-client interaction will depend to a considerable degree 
on the range of discretion granted to the caseworkers by the middle management, which in 
turn is highly contingent on the degree to which the middle management is made responsible 
for aggregate casework outcomes by the top-management (Lipsky, 1991, p. 215). And lastly, 
organizations employ both computerized classification tools and conversation guidelines for 
assessing clients’ needs or readiness to work as a means to structure the caseworker-client 
interaction, eliminating certain client concerns as ‘irrelevant’ from the conversation and 
thereby redefining the client’s life conditions in a way that matches the institutional 
prerequisites of the organization (Caswell, Marston, & Larsen, 2010).  
All of these factors – hiring policies, bureaucratic proceduralism, caseloads, incentive 
structures, discretion, and classification guidelines – are not determined by either the 
caseworker or the client, yet they do play a strong role in setting the framework for the 
caseworker-client interaction and thus in making certain types of client processing and client 
reaction much more likely than others. 
 
The organizational economy. In organizational-economic terms, some factors that 
influence the caseworker-client interaction by enlarging or reducing the caseworker’s room 
for maneuver include (a) the resources available to the organization in the form of “time, 
money, human resources and skills” (Lipsky, 1991, p. 213); (b) the internal budget structures 
of the organization, which can either be program-focused (e.g. two million dollars for the 
Young Jobseekers Employment Program in fiscal year 2012) or client-focused (e.g. a 
maximum of 12.000 dollars for every client in the first year of unemployment), with the 
difference being that some program-focused pots are likely to be exhausted before the end of 
the fiscal year, making it impossible to sign up more clients for programs that might otherwise 
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have served clients’ needs well; and (c) the quantity and quality of contracts with private 
providers of welfare services such as employment companies, counselors, community projects 
or trainers which, if well-managed, can increase the palette of services caseworkers can offer 
to clients (Bertelli & Smith, 2010; Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006). 
 
Organizational culture. In organizational-cultural terms, it has been noted that 
caseworkers must frequently accommodate disparate organizational goals and personal values 
in dealing with clients (Lipsky, 1980) and that organizational culture as “a particularistic 
system of symbols shaped by ambient society and the organization’s history, leadership and 
contingencies, differentially shared, used and modified by actors in the course of acting and 
making sense out of organizational events” (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984, p. 216) helps 
caseworkers to order their value preferences and decide which action logic to prioritize in any 
given situation. However, as Berg (2006) points out, there are usually various “communities 
of meaning and action” within every organization, and the behavior of a caseworker towards a 
client may in part be determined by the organizational ‘sub-culture’ (such as the 
traditionalists, the fatalistic isolationists, the competition-oriented individualists, the 
egalitarian team-players or the innovators) to which that caseworker belongs. In a U.S. 
context, Maynard-Moody and Musheno have further found divisions among caseworkers 
along less abstract and more primordial lines: “Like the relations across generations of 
residents in an urban neighborhood in flux, more seasoned and newer workers see things 
differently and draw on their generational enclaves for support. Tensions are evident in 
relations across distinct identity enclaves as brought to life by the same social signifiers that 
provide the grist for conflict and urban neighborhoods: race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, 
and sexuality” (2003, p. 75). In a European context, Knuth and Larsen (2010) found that 
differences in professional culture between municipal and PES caseworkers hamper 
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integrated client treatment in Danish and German Jobcenters. Where they exist, such frictions 
between caseworker sub-cultures are likely to go hand in hand with different approaches to 
casework in general, and specific client groups in particular. 
 
Social relations within the organization. In social terms, finally, in can be said that 
communication flows among caseworkers play an important role in reifying “prejudicial or 
beneficial” attitudes towards certain client groups among colleagues in a welfare organization 
(Lipsky, 1980, p. 156). Furthermore, Lipsky observes that good human relations within the 
welfare organization serve as a prerequisite for high-quality front-line services because 
disgruntled caseworkers may show signs of alienation and apathy or try to ‘punish’ their 
organization by not working well (1980, p. 17), once again with grave implications for clients. 
Lastly, the building, interior décor, location etc. of the welfare organization also conveys an 
implicit message about how much the organization values and respects its clients (cf. Dubois, 
2010, pp. 38-42; Yanow, 1996, esp. ch. 6), and this message is very likely to impact a client’s 
attitude and behavior towards a caseworker (e.g. trusting, watchful or defensive) irrespective 
of the caseworker’s actual performance and actions. 
To summarize, , a number of factors were presented above that may influence the final 
shape of a welfare policy as it emerges in the caseworker-client interaction within a particular 
organizational context. In order to come full circle, the following section will now give a short 
overview of factors in the local or regional, national, and international systemic environment 
of the welfare organization that might have an influence on how the organization interprets 
and implements welfare policy, again with marked consequences for the process and outcome 
of the caseworker-client interaction.       
         
The Systemic Context of Welfare Policy Implementation 
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As numerous authors writing in the (micro-) institutionalist tradition have pointed out, 
corporate actors and individual agents are always embedded in larger societal systems that 
“structure the perceptions, resources, and participation of those actors” and agents (Sabatier, 
1986, p. 35). For instance, Berman (1978, p. 17, 25) contends that the way in which a policy 
is implemented by local actors always depends on the “political, social and economic 
conditions of the local environment” which again is “embedded in a larger environment (e.g. 
general social and economic conditions).” Scott and Meyer add that the institutional 
environment of organizations is influenced by “generalized belief systems,” i.e. culture, “that 
define how specific types of organizations are to conduct themselves” (1991, p. 123). This 
systematization of the systemic environment of policy-implementing organizations, i.e. the 
local, regional, national and international level on the one hand and the economic, political, 
cultural and social sphere on the other hand, corresponds well with the basic propositions of 
systems theory (Parsons, 1951) in which culture is seen as the cognitive system that makes it 
possible for actors to know their place among people and objects and to act in that 
environment based on moral evaluations and judgments; the economy is seen as a system for 
the exchange of goods that determines people’s and collectives’ standard of living; politics is 
seen as a system of contention and debate in which actors wrestle to have their own ideal 
visions of the world cast into laws and regulations; and the social sphere is seen as the net of 
human relations that binds people together in both primordial and rationalistic collectives 
such as families, friendships, organizations, nations, or states. All of those levels and spheres 
shape and influence the interaction between caseworkers and clients in welfare organizations 
because both agents involved in the interaction are directly embedded in these systems as 
individuals, and because the implementing organization is embedded in these systems as a 
meso-system and institution. 
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The social environment. Among the social factors in the local, regional, national and 
international systemic environment of a welfare organization that shape both the 
organization’s policy adaptation and the caseworker-client interaction within the organization 
are the standard lifecourse and family patterns characteristic of a given society and/or 
historical era, such as delayed vs. early marriage, or the extended family vs. the nuclear 
family (Mayer, 2001); demographic trends such as population ageing due to falling birthrates; 
and patterns of immigration. 
 
The cultural environment. In the cultural system, the agenda-setting function of 
media and advocacy networks has important repercussions for the practices and routines of 
welfare organizations, for instance when changes of procedure are demanded by the public in 
response to a welfare-related tragedy or scandal (Duffy & Collins, 2010; Sabatier, 1986). 
Moreover, the legitimacy and goals of welfare organizations are contingent on wider societal 
discourses and more generally, “welfare culture” (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Van Oorschot, 
Opielka, & Pfau-Effinger, Eds., 2008). Thus, Duffy and Collins (2010) observe that child 
welfare is more oriented toward family needs and human rights in Northern Ireland than in the 
US, with marked differences between administrative procedures and child services as a result. 
Lastly, the reciprocal relationship between welfare organizations and citizens is not least 
shaped by cultural ideologies about what constitutes full membership in the nation in terms of 
gender, ethnicity, or religion (Bulpett, 2002; Calloni, 2005; Lewis, 1992; O’Connor, 1993). 
As an example, Dubois (2010, p. 70) notes that the official forms used by French welfare 
offices recognize only heterosexual couples.     
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The economic environment. In the economic system, class divisions within society 
(Baldwin, 1990), changes in the structure of economic production (e.g. deindustrialization, 
tertiarization), the economic growth rate, the unemployment rate, or the influence of trade 
unions are important factors in shaping and framing organizational policy implementation as 
well as the interaction between caseworkers and clients. For instance, Theodore and Peck 
(1999) have reported “considerable differences” in the implementation of the UK’s New Deal 
between Cambridge and Liverpool because different levels of unemployment confronted 
administrators with highly differential caseloads and work-related barriers. 
 
The political environment. Finally, in the local political environment, some of the 
systemic factors most relevant for the implementing organization’s policy approach as well as 
the caseworker-client interaction include directives from the municipal government, network 
structures between the implementing organization and other public or private organizations 
(Hvinden, 1991), and the existence of local or regional “partnerships for inclusion” between a  
public employment service and employers, trade unions, or NGOs (Mailand & Andersen, 
2004). At the national level, existing legislation and welfare reform agendas (Ferrera & 
Hemerijk, 2003; Pierson, 1996) affect the local and individual conditions of policy-
implementation just as much as the structure of the federal bureaucratic apparatus (Pierson, 
1995), long-established governance traditions (Kaufmann, 1986; Poulsen, 2009), and the 
emergence of new policy paradigms (Hall, 1993; Jessop, 1999; ). Finally, at the supra-national 
level, international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) or the European Union participate in setting the framework for micro-
level policy implementation, for instance by distributing budgets to selected municipalities or 
projects through the European Social Fund (Moreno & Palier, 2005; Verschraegen, 
Vanhercke & Verpoorten, 2011). 
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Figure 3 summarizes the systemic factors which have been identified in this paper as 
influencing the caseworker-client interaction in a local organizational policy implementation 
context.     
 
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This paper has argued that in today’s era of activation and the localization of welfare, 
the implementers of social policy are faced with complex challenges that go beyond the intra-
organizational dynamics described by Lipsky thirty-two years ago. While activation’s focus 
on tailor-made services has increased the influence of individual agents such as managers, 
caseworkers and clients on the redistributive outcomes produced by the welfare state, 
processes of decentralization and devolution are making the implementing organizations more 
susceptible and vulnerable to wider political, economic, cultural and social developments. In 
order to theoretically accommodate these changed conditions under which today’s 
caseworkers operate, it has been proposed to marry Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy 
framework with institutionalist theory and in particular sociological institutionalism, arriving 
at a micro-institutionalist theory of policy implementation.  
The core stipulation of such a theory is that the welfare state as an institution does not 
live in abstract regulations and legal texts but rather in the day-to-day interactions between 
caseworkers and clients in local welfare offices. As offset against both Lipsky’s original 
approach and macro-institutional analyses of social policy, this statement carries two 
important insights. On the one hand, it means that the aggregated actions of the individuals 
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implementing social policy have the power to change the institution of the welfare state and 
even wider societal systems. For example, when the aggregate outcome of caseworker action 
is that many unemployed single mothers stay at home in spite of a law that requires them to 
look for work, this will not only change de-facto social policy but also have a societal impact 
on family structures and the composition of the labor force.  On the other hand,  the 
contention that the welfare state is real only in so far as it is instantiated in personal 
interactions implies that the institutional outputs and systemic outcomes of welfare states are 
likely to vary across the organizational and local contexts in which these interactions are 
embedded. In a nutshell, micro-institutionalism would thus posit that welfare states are neither 
monolithic across micro-level contexts, nor static even in the absence of formal rule changes. 
Rather, welfare states are seen as institutionally diverse not only across but also within 
national boundaries, and as being constantly in flux as a result of aggregated and at least 
partly autonomous micro-level actions. 
By way of conclusion, a micro-institutionalist approach to policy implementation 
develops the original street-level bureaucracy approach further in four central respects. 
Firstly, it makes explicit the interrelatedness between the caseworker-client interaction and its 
wider institutional and systemic context. As Berman notes: “Because implementation – like 
other human problem solving activities … – arises from the interaction of a policy with its 
setting, we cannot anticipate the development of a … theory of implementation that is 
‘context-free’” (1978, p. 32). Secondly, because micro-institutionalism acknowledges that 
interaction is never unidimensional, it draws our attention to the fact that not only the 
caseworker, but also the client shapes the process and outcome of his or her interaction with 
the welfare state, just as the caseworker may act very differently depending on who the client 
is and what that means to her or him (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). Thirdly, micro-
institutionalism puts flesh to the bones of Esping-Andersen’s claim that the welfare state “is, 
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND THE WELFARE STATE                                                       25 
 
in its own right, a system of stratification” (1990, p. 23; cf. also Korpi, 1983) because it 
explicates the social mechanisms by which the welfare state as an institutions frames and 
shapes the caseworker-client interaction, thereby also welfare outcomes for clients and 
eventually, in an aggregated way, societal structures. And lastly, micro-institutionalism 
provides a theoretical framework for bringing together two scientific approaches that are both 
vital to an understanding of social policy-related issues, but which have hitherto lead a rather 
separate life: culturalist or phenomenological approaches on the one hand, and rationalist or 
realist approaches on the other hand (Jepperson, 1991).  
In a world in which social policy is increasingly framed in terms of activation, i.e. 
tailor-made and needs-based services used as an instrument of ‘human investment’ rather than 
social protection, and where the local implementation level is thus becoming increasingly 
important in determining how citizen-clients are treated by the welfare state and ‘who gets 
what,’ micro-institutionalism therefore provides a very useful theoretical framework for 
understanding how societal systems and institutions affect the interaction between citizens 
and welfare caseworkers, as well as how that interaction shapes societal structures in return.      
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Institutions as ideational blueprints mediating between societal systems and 
individual action. 
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Figure 2. Organizations as (a) meso-systems built around a core institution or set of 
institutions, and (b) as having institutional characteristics in their own right. 
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Figure 3. Overview of systems and institutions influencing the caseworker-client interaction. 
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     i So far, micro-institutionalism has mainly been applied in the area of public goods theory and particularly 
environmental policy research (cf. Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Bressers, 2007). 
     ii In Sewell’s (1992) terms, institutions could be equated with “rules” or “schemas” whereas systems could be 
equated with “resources”. Together, rules or schemas and resources compose “structure” as juxtaposed with 
“agency”. 
